David Robertson, aka The Wee Flea has shared his latest Christian Today article on his blog. In it he responds to the recently shared proposal for a definition of “Islamophobia” from the UK Government.
Robertson expresses concerns that this amounts to a return to the blasphemy laws of the past but specifically designed to protect Islam when there are no such protections for other religions including Christianity. Indeed, perhaps the fear is that such blasphemy laws are at the expense of Christianity.
Tim Dieppe of Christian Concern has raised similar concerns and I responded to them here. However, perhaps it is worth responding specifically to the examples and concerns that David raises. I think that they are best responded to by looking at what the proposed definition says. As a reminder, here it is:
“Anti-Muslim hostility is engaging in or encouraging criminal acts, including acts of violence, vandalism of property, and harassment and intimidation whether physical, verbal, written or electronically communicated, which is directed at Muslims or those perceived to be Muslims because of their religion, ethnicity or appearance.
“It is also the prejudicial stereotyping and racialisation of Muslims, as part of a collective group with set characteristics, to stir up hatred against them, irrespective of their actual opinions, beliefs or actions as individuals.
“It is engaging in prohibited discrimination where the relevant conduct – including the creation or use of practices and biases within institutions – is intended to disadvantage Muslims in public and economic life.”
In summary, there are three aspects to the definition. First, criminal acts targeted at Muslims because they are Muslim. Second, stereotyping of Muslims in a prejudicial manner. Third, prohibited discrimination disadvantaging Muslims.
Let’s take a look at the examples Robertson raises. First, he cites Sir John Jenkins, a former ambassador to Iraq as saying that a definition might limit our ability to critique the Iranian regime.
““If you make a point of criticising the way the Islamic Republic seeks to oppress women by mandatory veiling you will be criticised for expressing hostility to a particular facet of being Muslim,” he said.”
Well, let’s run that through the test of the actual draft definition as opposed to previous attempts. Would criticism of the Iranian regime incite or engage in criminal activity? No, it would not involved encouragement for people to engage in violence or vandalism. Does it stereotype? Again no, it specifically critiques one regime in a way that clearly distinguishes the Iranian regime from other Muslims. We don’t even need to move to the question of whether or not it would be prejudicial.
What would fit the definition here would be if I were to suggest that all Muslims or even all Iranian Muslims must by the nature of their very Muslimness agree with and share the values and agenda of the Ayatollahs. I might even express that as a suggestion that any Muslim woman wearing the hijab is implicitly siding with the Ayatollahs. If I were to deface the local mosque with slogans to this effect, of encourage the lynching of people wearing Islamic cultural dress then I would come within the terms of the definition. If I chose not to employ someone in my workplace because they were Iranian, wore a hijab or had a Muslim sounding name and I explained that this was because all Muslims are jihadis seeking to serve the Islamic Repubic then I would come within the scope of the definition.
Robertson goes on to argue:
The government argues that its legislation will not restrict the right to criticise a particular religion, but it is difficult to see how that view can be compatible with the Islamic view that any criticism of Islam, Muhammad or the Quran is hateful. If you doubt this, ask any newspaper or magazine editor if they would ever publish a cartoon of Muhammad! Indeed, would the BBC ever let any of its Sunday preachers, or thought for the day contributors, say anything even remotely critical of Islam?
Now, there may be issues in terms of our culture at present in terms of how people may act, especially motivated by feart. However, again, the answer to the dilemma here is simple. Look at the definition. It is explicitly clear that this is not about critiquing or even mocking Islam. If our society finds other ways to control and restrict such activities whilst allowing criticism and mockery of Christianity or Judaism, then that is a different matter (and it is worth noting that we do have a legal definition of antisemitism and that hasn’t prevented critique of Judaism, Israel or the Jewish God). Robertson’s reference to what newspapers will and will not do is a red herring. The question is whether or not criticism of Islam or the Quran, stereotypes, discriminates against or incites violence against Muslims. Of course there are ways in which a critique can do those things but surely we shouldn’t be wanting to do that.
Here’s another red herring:
“If you want to know how far our society has regressed from the freedom of speech, press and religion that was so inherent in our Christian foundations, ask yourself: can you imagine Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses being published today?”
It’s almost as though Robertson has forgotten what did happen when that book was published. However, again, would the book have fallen foul of the legal definition? No. The only definitions it may have fallen foul of would have been those determining what counts as good and bad literature. But consider another example. Would Khaled Hossaini’s books A Thousand Splendid Suns and Kite Runner be censured under the definition? Quite obviously not. What would be prevented would be any targeting of the author because he writes about Muslims and Muslim culture or because he is himself Muslim.
Robertson claims:
“There is one other concern – and it is a big one, one which affects Christian magazines like Christian Today and writers like yours truly. At the moment we can publish articles like this, but I can see a day coming in the not-too-distant future when lawyers will suggest that we don’t, and when writers like me will be prosecuted under the Islamophobia blasphemy law for spreading hate against Muslims.”
Now, it may or may not be the case that such pressure will come but once again that will not be based on this definition. And it simply isn’t good reasoning to argue that a definition is good or bad based on other things that are already happening quite separately to the existence of such a definition. This is the equivalent of the kind of lousy exegesis and argument which says “some people are bad parents, therefore the doctrine of penal substitution is terrible because it will encourage them to be bad parents even more.”
It’s worth picking up on the two recent incidents cited by Robertson as examples. First, David refers to the banning of Maccabee Tel Aviv fans from a recent football game at Aston Villa. This misses a couple of points. First, a definition of Islamophobia might have helped correct the assumption that all of the residents of Aston and Perry Barr were instinctively violent and needed appeasing. Secondly, a policing decision based on likely levels isn’t going to be changed by the presence or absence of an Islamophobia definition. It wasn’t a fear of being taken to court for Islamophobia that influenced the decision. Thirdly, the existence of another definition, that of antisemitism has been important, especially in terms of structural and implicit bias in helping us to understand what went wrong with that decision. It’s worth noting that the same kinds of arguments are frequently rehearsed by those opposing the definition of antisemitism.
The other example cited is a march organised by UKIP and billed as a “march with Jesus.” As it happens, the outcome was a re-routing of the march. It’s a rather bad example, not just because of that but because far from being some kind of act of Christian witness, it was a political action by the fringe right and because our religious and political freedoms don’t and never have entitled us to organise marches where and when we please, especially when such events are likely to stir up trouble in local communities.
Now, the proposed definition is not perfect and there are perfectly reasonable arguments to be made for not having one at all (though I happen to disagree having changed my mind on this). However, such arguments are best made by engaging with the actual definition.
Faithroots 